A Concession in Negotiations Made under the Influence of Authority: The Influence of External and Internal Locus of Control

Aim. To examine the interrelation of locus of control that serves as a predictor of willingness to make concessions in negotiations, depending on the negotiator’s subjective assessment of the opponent’s informal authority.
Methodology. The study sample consisted of 32 adults (16 men and 16 women) aged (M=37.91, SD=11.86), who have at least two years of experience in entrepreneurial activity and business negotiations. locus of control was assessed by H. Levenson’s Multidimensional Locus of Control Scale. Negotiation behaviour was modelled using a multi-round version of the “Ultimatum Game.” Participants interacted with opponents whom they subjectively evaluated as possessing either high or low informal authority. The assessment of informal authority was conducted using a modified version of Yu. P. Stepkin’s method. Negotiation outcomes were measured by two indicators such as the minimum acceptable offer and the refusal to accept any offers. Data was analysed using mathematical statistical methods (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, point-biserial correlation, Mann–Whitney U test, and Kruskal–Wallis test).
Results. The findings revealed that an external locus of control serves as a significant predictor of greater willingness to make concessions when negotiating with an opponent perceived as having high informal authority. No significant correlation was found between internal locus of control and concession behaviour depending on the opponent’s level of informal authority. However, a general trend was observed among participants with relatively high internal locus of control to concede to those they considered to have informal authority and to withhold concessions from those they perceived as lacking authority. The scientific novelty of the study lies in considering the multidimensional locus of control as a predictor of negotiation behaviour in relation to the subjective assessment of the opponent’s informal authority.
Research implications. The results broaden understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying concession behaviour in negotiations. The study highlights the role of locus of control as a predictor of willingness to make concessions depending on the perceived informal authority of the opponent. The findings can be applied in the analysis and forecasting of negotiation behaviour, as well as in the development of training programs for negotiation professionals.

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